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PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Senate Bill 106 was proposed during the 2018 General Assembly Session to address             
redistricting in anticipation of the 2020 U.S. Census and 2021 redistricting process in Virginia.              
Redistricting is done at the state level by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor.                
In the past, redistricting efforts have shown to favor of incumbents in the state and are less                 
competitive. The Voting Rights Act is broad, which has allowed states to interpret and assess               
competitiveness in legislative districts differently. The current Virginia map shows a state that             
favors one party over the other, and appears to pack minority voters into certain districts, which                
the Appeals Court in ​Bethune-Hill v Virginia State Board of Elections (2018) ​ultimately             
determined was illegal. This report explores options for optimizing minority voting power and             
increasing opportunity for minority representation in the Virginia legislature. 
 
LEGISLATION OVERVIEW 
Redistricting in the Commonwealth 
Virginia has historically used redistricting to dilute minority voting power through “cracking” and             
“packing”. Cracking involves splitting communities amongst many majority-white districts to          
eliminate minority voting power. Packing places as many minority votes as possible into one              
district, to minimize the number of sears that minorities could win control (Levitt, 2018). In 2013,                
Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the preclearance requirement, meaning redistricting bills no            
longer require review by the Department of Justice, and litigation is the only way to challenge                
redistricting. Prior to 2013, Virginia’s redistricting plans were subject to review by the             
Department of Justice as per Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to address a history of                 
discrimination against minority voters (Pierce & Rabinowitz, 2017). The Voting Rights Act            
required Virginia to adhere to “preclearance”, requiring any changes made to legislative or             
congressional districts to be reviewed by the Department of Justice. Virginia was identified as              
one of the “preclearance” states by a formula that took into account voter turnout statistics and                
use of voter suppression devices such as literacy tests or voter identification (Cable, 2013).  
Lawsuits have been filed in response to 2013. In ​Bethune-Hill v Virginia State Board of Elections                
(2018)​, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to reexamine current legislative maps for              
evidence of racial bias and gerrymandered districts that dilute the impact of African American              
voters (Barnes and Schneider, 2017). In June 2018, the district court ruled that 11 of the state                 
legislative districts had been subject to racial gerrymandering and needed to be redrawn by              
October 30, 2018 (Levitt, 2018).  
Several proposals have been put forth by members of both the Democratic and Republican              
parties to redraw the legislative districts before October 30, 2018; however, there has been              
widespread disagreement on how the lines are to be drawn. The federal court has appointed a                
 
 
 
special expert to redraw state legislative districts by March 28, 2019 due to the impasse among                
the legislature (Associated Press, 2018). 
SB106 is a redistricting bill, focused on setting forth new criteria for congressional and              
legislative districts. It requires the following criteria be considered in drawing districts:            
population, requirements of state and federal law, existing political boundaries, contiguous and            
compact territory, and communities of interest. 
Goals and Implementation 
One of the main goals for SB106 was to address issues of compactness. While compactness               
was not specifically defined in the legislation, SB106 stipulated that the General Assembly must              
provide numerical measures of individual and average district compactness to provide an            
“objective assessment.” Compactness is generally understood to mean how regular in shape a             
district is and how close a district’s boundaries are to its geographic center (Kaufman, 2018).               
The more certain areas protrude from the rest of the district, the less compact the district                
becomes. The latest boundary lines drawn from the 2010 census redistricting effort, split up              
many localities (Smith, 2018). Senator David Suetterlein noted in a committee hearing that his              
own district split up many communities in Southwest Virginia and he wanted to address the               
issue of compactness through SB106 (​Suetterlein, 2018). ​Members of the Virginia Legislative            
Black Caucus and Governor Ralph Northam have expressed concerns that the bill did not go far                
enough in protecting minority votes. (Office of the Governor, 2018). Governor Northam stated             
that criteria should “prohibit districts that favor or disfavor any political party, incumbent             
legislator, member of Congress or individual or entity”.  
Existing procedures for redistricting rely on magistrates and local governments to update            
districts for their constituents without a central statewide mapping system. According to the             
Department of Elections, the state does not have a central mapping system to help verify that                
voters are in the correct districts. SB 106 was seeking to establish more equitable approach to                
the redrawing of the boundaries that does not dilute communities of interest voters.             
Communities of interest is defined by SB 106 as homogeneous neighborhoods or separate             
groups of people living in an area with similar interests or needs in transportation, employment,               
or culture. Racial and ethnic minorities are not explicitly defined as communities of interest, and               
leaves the redistricting process at risk for “race-blind” strategies that leave historically            
marginalized and disenfranchised communities without a voice due to dilution across multiple            
districts. The Republicans currently control the House and Senate and could therefore control             
the legislature for the 2020 redistricting. Without the Department of Justice intervening, it             
remains to be seen how the legislative districts will be drawn.  
Redistricting: Understanding the Players  
Redistricting was last revisited in Virginia in 2011 with HB 5005, supported by both Republicans               
and Democrats. HB 5005 intended to provide objective criteria for redistricting to create             
competitive congressional and legislative districts in the Commonwealth. However, neither          
party, regardless of who is in power, has taken steps to completely ensure this (Levitt, 2018).                
Lines have been drawn to keep certain candidates from having competitive elections, effectively             
keeping their power over that district. Incumbents are less likely to change boundary lines due               
to name recognition with their voters and assumed continued voter loyalty (Levitt, 2018).  
Virginia’s elections appear to be less competitive. Specifically, state House and Senate districts             
have become less contested overtime since 1997. Additionally​, efforts to maintain existing            
majority-minority districts may lead to decreased competitiveness and increased incumbency          
 
 
 
advantage in adjacent districts (Forgette et al., 2009). ​The lack of competitiveness is a concern,               
since voter preferences may change over time, and current incumbents may not represent             
current voter preferences. Studies show that voter turnout is higher when voters perceive that              
an election is competitive (Levitt, 2018). Virginia voters may be dissuaded from voting since few               
districts are deemed competitive. 
Many interest groups generally support redistricting efforts in Virginia. Brian Cannon, Executive            1
Director of OneVirginia2021, expressed support for SB 106 as a step forward in redistricting              
reform. Of the supporters for redistricting reform, many were committed to the intent to address               
compactness, as it is a requirement of the Virginia State Constitution (Joachim, 2018; Wilson,              
2018). The state Republican Party had widespread support for the bill in the Senate and House,                
with all Senate members voting for the bill, and the majority of Republican members in the                
House. 
Opponents of the legislation included several Democratic members of the legislature and the             
state and national Democratic Party. Senator George Barker (D - 39​th District) opposed the bill               
due to the prioritization of political subdivisions, and emphasized the need for legal and fair               
determination of boundaries with a focus on the Commonwealth as whole, not individual             
subdivisions (Iowkell, 2018). Similarly, Senator Jennifer McClellan (D – 9​th District) opposed the             
bill because it prioritized political subdivisions and boundaries, but did not hold communities of              
interest sacrosanct. She also believed it was premature to move forward with legislation while              
federal cases regarding the use of race in drawing district boundaries are under deliberation              
(Iowkell, 2018).  
Racial Disparity: Minority Participation and Representation 
Virginia has seen a change in its demographic makeup, with Black, non-Hispanic Asian and              
Hispanic populations projected to grow by 2040 and constitute more than half of the population               
(VPAP, 2017). Virginia is also aging fast; one in five Virginians will be over 65 years by 2030                  
(Sen, 2017). With changing demographics, election competitiveness will also change over time.            
Incumbents from well-rounded districts will need to shift from traditional partisan approaches to             
coalition building around shared values in order to remain competitive among an increasingly             
diverse electorate. The 2017 election produced some very close races, sending more women,             
Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans to the Virginia state legislature than in years past.              
However, there is room for additional progress to make the legislature more representative of              
the electorate. Virginia’s electorate is about 50% female, 60% Caucasian with a median age of               
45, and nearly 40% are college graduates, whereas state legislators skew male (>70%), older              
(55yo), and are predominantly Caucasian (80%+) college graduates (>80%) (Figure 1).           
Historically, in order to diversify legislatures and get minorities elected, majority-minority districts            
have been used as a primary solution. 
Throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s, districts needed to be 50% or more African American for                
the favored candidate to win, but now in an increasingly diverse state, 40-45% representation              
may be sufficient (Pildes, 2002). In 2016, 50 of the 96 minority members elected to the House                 
came from districts with no racial majority or a white majority (Wasserman, 2018). The              
campaigns of minority candidates across the U.S., who are increasingly winning in districts that              
are not dominated by one minority group, highlight the opportunity for a diverse electorate to               
form interracial political coalitions to elect minority candidates (Pildes, 2002; Wasserman, 2018).            
1 ​League of Women Voters, Rotary Clubs, Tea Party supporters, AAUW, the Virginia Municipal League, 
OneVirginia2021, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. and the NAACP.  
 
 
 
Current evidence shows that the process of redistricting has a statistically significant impact on              
the political participation rates of African Americans (Hayes & McKee, 2012). There are             
significant information costs with redistricting that impact African-American voter turnout, in part            
due to socioeconomic factors (Hayes & McKee, 2012). Specifically, redrawn citizens are less             
likely to be able to identify their incumbent and this lack of familiarity with their representative                
produces higher non-voting rates in congressional contests (Hayes & McKee, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  
 
RACIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Research has shown that an independent redistricting commission would increase competition           
and create better outcomes for minority voters (Carson & Crespin, 2004). According to The              
Virginia Public Access Project (VPAP), Virginia House and Senate districts have become less             
contested overtime. An efficiency gap analysis was done on all congressional and state             
legislative elections to determine whether a political party may have won, widened, or retained              
its grip on power through political gerrymandering and found that Virginia leaned more             
Republican after election results (Lieb, 2017). According to the Princeton Gerrymandering           2
2 The formula compares the statewide average share of the vote a party receives in each district with the statewide percentage of 
seats it wins, taking into account a common political expectation: For each 1 percentage point gain in its statewide vote share, a 
 
 
 
Project, Republicans held a statistical consistent advantage and were favored to win more seats              
during the 2017 legislative district elections. Virginia’s legislative districts have been statistically            
shown to be less competitive and in favor of one political party over the other. Redistricting in                 
Virginia is inherently a political process that benefits incumbents (Betts, 2001). It has reduced              
community engagement, minority voter participation, and competitiveness. As such, studies          
have shown that outcomes for minorities and competitiveness are increased when redistricting            
happens at the court level or with independent redistricting commissions (Betts, 2001). In order              
to fully understand the possible outcomes in states that use redistricting commissions, this             
report will look at California and Arizona. 
Three criteria will be used to evaluate the three states. Competitiveness will be looked at in                
terms of margin of victory of the last state legislative elections and term limits of legislators. A                 
percentage point of 10% or less for margin of victory will be considered to be more competitive                 
(​McGhee, 2018)​. Any races considered to have a margin of victory above 10% will be               
considered to be not competitive. Secondly, minority voter participation will be measured by             
percentage of minorities who cast vote in the last legislative election for the respective states.               
Finally, minority voter engagement will be evaluated by minority participation in the redistricting             
process.  
 
Arizona 
Arizona instituted an independent redistricting commission through Arizona Proposition 106, a           
constitutional amendment on the ballot in 2001 (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,           
2001). The commission consists of two Republicans and two Democrats who are selected by              
state party leaders (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 2001). There is also one            
independent commissioner who is selected by Democrats and Republicans on the commission.            
Certain criteria must be followed when drawing the maps, starting with a basic grid map,               
showing no previous district boundaries. The redistricting commission has faced challenges in            
court by the Arizona legislature, claiming that the commission did not have the authority to               
redraw the maps (Loyola Law School, n.d.). The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the              
commission was legally able to draw the boundaries (Brennan Center for Justice, 2015).             
Arizona’s independent redistricting commission holds rounds of public hearings on proposed           
legislative maps in different regions of the state (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,            
2001). The five-member commission holds regular meetings open to the public, posting all             
minutes, documents, and transcripts online, thus facilitating an open, transparent process.           
Despite the number of public hearings and meetings held by the commission, minority voter              
participation in subsequent elections has remained low and has decreased over time            
(Daugherty & Garcia, 2018). African American participation in elections decreased by nine            
percent and Hispanics by 14% between 2010 to 2014. 
Arizona has a high turnover rate that has risen since the passage of term limits in 1993                 
(Berman, 2004). Legislators serve two year terms with term limits of up to four (National               
Conference of State Legislatures, 2018). Term limits however have had little to no effect on               
minorities represented in the state legislature, with the exception of Hispanics, possibly due to              
changes in population (Berman, 2004). House districts elect two candidates from each district             
which makes it difficult to compare margin of victory. For the purposes of this analysis, only the                 
Arizona senate elections will be used for comparison. The last legislative elections in Arizona              
party normally increases its seat share by 2 percentage points. So a party that receives 55% of the statewide vote could expect to 
win 60 % of the legislative seats. 
 
 
 
occurred in 2016. Almost 50% of the Arizona state senate candidates went unopposed in the               
election (13/30 races). Despite having an independent redistricting commission and term limits,            
Arizona appears to have few competitive districts. The districts compared against the United             
States actually fair​ ​more​ ​competitive than other states on average (Soffen, 2015).  
Arizona 
Senate 2014 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
30 30 5 4 Districts 26 Districts 
Senate 2016 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
30 30 12 4 Districts 26 Districts 
Source: Arizona Secretary of State. (2016, November 29). State of Arizona Official Canvass General Election, November 8, 2016. Retrieved 
October 24, 2018, from https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2016/General/Official%20Signed%20State%20Canvass.pdf 
 
California  
California instituted an independent redistricting commission in 2008 (Loyola Law School, n.d.).            
The 14 commission seats are appointed without legislative involvement, and are divided almost             
evenly between registered Democrats, Republicans, and Independents (McGhee, 2018). The          
members are not allowed to be involved with politics and are required to have an open,                
transparent process. The independent redistricting commission hold 30 public meetings before           
the maps were drawn and 30 public meetings after the maps are drawn (Shupe, 2018). The                
state became a majority-minority state after the 2000 U.S. Census but has seen less              
participation from African Americans, Hispanics and Asian Americans (Baldassare et al., 2018).            
Efforts through the Irvine Foundation and other interest groups have worked to ensure that              
multiple voices, including those of minorities, were included in the commission’s redistricting            
process (James Irvine Foundation, 2010). 
California state senators serve four-year terms with a two-term limit, and California assembly             
members serve for two years with a three-term limit (National Conference of State Legislatures,              
2018). Since term limits were passed in 1990, the legislature has seen more representation by               
minorities (​Cain, & Kousser, 2004). In 2014 only four races in the assembly went uncontested               
(California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, 2014). In 2016, the competitiveness ​of the             
assembly districts decreased, with 14 races having a 16% or less margin of victory. The number                
of competitive senate races increased to 20% with five districts with a 16% or less margin of                 
victory (California Research Bureau, 2016).  
Despite California becoming a majority-minority state, there is still a disparity in minority voter              
participation in state legislative elections. Non-Hispanic whites make up 42% of the state’s adult              
population, but constitute about 59% of the state’s likely voters (Baldassare et al., 2018).              
According to the Public Policy Institute of California, 50% of Asian American adult citizens, 53%               
 
 
 
of Hispanic adult citizens, and 58% of African American adult citizens are likely to vote,               
compared to 75% of white adult citizens. Minority voter participation is down, similar to Arizona,               
however California appears to have more contested elections and more competitive elections. 
California 
Senate 2014 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
40 20 0 5 Districts 15 Districts 
Senate 2016 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
40 20 0 5 Districts 15 Districts 
House 2014 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
80 80 4 14 66 
House 2016 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
80 80 2 12 68 
Source: California Secretary of State Alex Padilla. (2016). Statement of Vote November 8, 2016, General Election. Retrieved 
October 24, 2018, from https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov.pdf 
 
Virginia  
Virginia has open public committee meetings for passage of redistricting bills and maps during              
the General Assembly session. Six public hearings were held around the state in 2010, prior to                
the 2011 General Assembly session, conducted by the house committee on privileges and             
elections (Cole, 2010). Then Governor, Bob McDonnell created an Independent Advisory           
Commission which held four public meetings across the Commonwealth, to gather input on the              
redistricting process (Independent Bipartisan Advisory Commission on Redistricting        
Commonwealth of Virginia. (2011). The ​commission found that transparency and the splitting of             
precincts for legislative districts were of concern from members of the public. 
Members of the Virginia Senate serve four years with no term limits and members of the House                 
of Delegates serve for two years with no term limits (Va. Const, art. IV ​§§ 2 & 3). In the 2015                     
Senate and House of Delegates elections, 79 seats went uncontested, all of whom were              
 
 
 
incumbents. This presents a challenge in those districts for competitiveness since there are no              
term limits and fewer candidates entering the race. ​Redistricting takes place in the Virginia              
General Assembly redistricting committee in each house. The house of delegates committee            
consists of four Republicans and two Democrats, and the senate committee consists of three              
Republicans and five Democrats (VA General Assembly, 2011). HB 5005 was the last             
redistricting bill passed in 2011, which set forth the current legislative boundaries. In 2017, the               
number of uncontested seats in the House went down from 62 to 33 seats (Virginia Department                
of Elections, 2018). The number of seats increased in competitiveness and less seats went              
uncontested, bringing Virginia in line with Arizona and California in having about 20% or more               
seats competitive.  
Virginia 
Senate 2015 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
40 40 17 6 Districts 34 Districts 
Senate 2017 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
40 2 0 1 Districts 1 Districts 
House 2015 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
100 100 62 3 97 
House 2017 
Total Seats  Available Seats # Unopposed  Competitive  
( 5%-10%)≤  
Non-Competitive 
(≥10%) 
100 100 33 22 78 
Source: Virginia Department of Elections. (2018). Virginia Elections Database » Search Elections. Retrieved October 29, 2018, 
from http://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/search/year_from:2017/year_to:2017/office_id:9/stage:General. 
 
Minority voter participation in Virginia is consistent with Arizona and California; it is significantly              
lower than non-Hispanic white voters (Krogstad & Lopez, 2017). According to the U.S. Census,              
African American voter participation rates decreased from 62% to 55.9% from 2012 to 2016, but               
Hispanic voter participation remained stagnant at about 31% (U.S. Census, 2018). These            
statistics are troubling considering about 36% of the total Virginia population belongs to a racial               
or ethnic minority and the state is projected to be a majority-minority state by 2040 (VPAP,                
 
 
 
2017). Considering the turnout rate of minorities, especially African Americans is lower than the              
population total in the state, it is concerning that the Virginia General Assembly may not               
necessarily reflect the preferences of minority groups in Virginia. ​Figure 1 shows the current              
makeup of the General Assembly in relation to population trends of the state.  
R​ECOMMENDATIONS 
During the 2018 General Assembly session, over 20 bills related to redistricting were             
introduced, highlighting the importance of the issue and the legislature’s willingness to consider             
strategies for improving the process. However, there are differing approaches to redistricting,            
specific to the criteria used for redistricting and the persons involved in the final decisions.               
Therefore, in order to best use redistricting to maximize the voting power of communities of               
color, we have three key recommendations. 
 
Recommendation 1: Optimize community voices through community engagement 
Best practices identified from community driven redistricting, such as the one in Oakland,             
California, include an open, transparent process with community meetings targeting young           
people, immigrants, people of color and other traditionally marginalized groups (Oakland Votes            
Redistricting Commission, 2014). Virginia should intentionally employ an open, transparent          
process of community engagement that equips the community with the tools to create maps that               
allow them to self-define their communities. In order to mobilize communities of color to              
participate in redistricting events, engagement strategies akin to those used for voter            
registration and get out the vote initiatives (door knocking, calling community members,            
emailing) and engagement key community brokers should all be employed. These efforts to             
engage the community in the redistricting process will allow for the process to (1) become more                
transparent; (2) provide more opportunities for communities of interest to express the needs and              
desires of their respective communities; and (3) foster a greater sense of inclusion in the               
process.  
 
Recommendation 2: Establishing a Non-Partisan Solution to Redistricting 
Across the nation, seven states use independent commissions to draw congressional districts            
and 13 use independent commissions to establish state legislative district boundaries. The            
General Assembly is showing signs of creating a possible redistricting commission independent            
from the legislative body under SJ 25, a resolution introduced in 2018 and is anticipated to be                 
re-introduced in 2019. This resolution seeks to create a seven-member bipartisan appointed            
commission. Poll results suggest there is public support for putting the redistricting process into              
the hands of an independent redistricting commission. A recent poll conducted by the Judy Ford               
Wason Center for Public Policy at Christopher Newport University found that over 60% of              
Virginians would support a state constitutional amendment to institute a nonpartisan redistricting            
commission (Joachim, 2018). Given this public support for an independent redistricting           
commission, the General Assembly should consider moving forward with SJ 25. Multiple            
stakeholder groups have expressed support for the creation of an independent commission built             
on non-partisan criteria that would use Census data and community input to develop state              
legislative and congressional maps (Albiges, 2018).  
 
Recommendation 3: Unpack majority minority districts 
Unpacking majority-minority districts provides greater opportunity for minorities to build diverse           
coalitions with like-minded voters. In the short-term, this process can begin with the             
development of remedy maps that resolve the racial gerrymander deemed present in 11 House              
 
 
 
of Delegate districts. Addressing racial gerrymandering is anticipated to (1) influence districts            
where the voting age population of minorities will increase such that incumbents must             
intentionally engage with this community in order to be reelected; and (2) challenge districts              
where the voting age population of minorities will substantially increase, creating opportunity for             
a minority primary challenger. In the long-term, redistricting efforts beginning 2021, using 2020             
Census data, should not establish a specific minority voting age population threshold for the              
creation of district boundaries (i.e. >55% African American voting age population). Instead,            
respect for geographic boundaries (such as counties and voting precincts) and communities of             
interest, that specifically indicate racial and ethnic minorities, should be considered. It would be              
reasonable to consider the creation of smaller precincts in order to give voters more options and                
to optimize voting numbers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the founding of the country, the voting power of communities of color has been in                
contention. While the Supreme Court has confirmed that voting is a fundamental political right              
and all voters are equal, there remain barriers to voting that disproportionately impact African              
Americans, Hispanics, young voters, low wage earners, and people with disabilities (Lieberman,            
2012). Voting barriers include restrictions to voter registration, absentee and early voting, voter             
identification, voter purging, and rights restoration. Virginia currently requires photo identification           
at the polls and multiple bills were forwarded in the 2018 General Assembly session either to                
revoke or to increase the stringency of photo identification requirements. Virginia is making             
progress in regards to rights restoration for formerly incarcerated persons, however, redistricting            
remains a prime opportunity to further optimize the voting power of Virginia’s minority             
communities. SB 106 proposed criteria to guide the redistricting process in anticipation of the              
2020 Census. Nationally, we have seen other states take on the challenge of a fair, open and                 
transparent redistricting process, by centering not just the criteria for drawing the district lines              
but the persons in charge of process. In particular, states that implement redistricting well,              
engage communities that have historically been marginalized. Virginia is poised to follow suit.             
During the 2018 General Assembly session, legislators forwarded several pieces of legislation,            
such as SJ 25, seeking to establish an independent, bipartisan redistricting commission.  
While an independent redistricting commission is an approach proven to enhance competition            
and create better outcomes for minority voters, this inherently political process requires            
community engagement in order to truly reflect community priorities (Carson & Crespin, 2004).             
Intentional outreach to communities of color and equipping them with the skills to draw maps will                
optimize their voting power. Instead of being locked out of critical conversations, communities of              
color will direct the conversations and have a greater chance of electing candidates of their               
choosing. Furthermore, by unpacking majority-minority districts and collaborating with politically          
like-minded voters across multi-racial coalitions, communities of color will not suffer dilution of             
their voting power.  
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Key Terms
• Redistricting
• Compactness
• Gerrymandering
• Cracking
• Packing
• Communities of Interest
• Contiguity
Define: Redistricting
The process of drawing electoral district boundaries 
in the United States. Because districts may change 
demographically and populations too, district 
boundaries are redrawn every 10 years. This should 
ensure that the districts are reflective and 
representative of the electorate.
Define: Compactness
Generally understood to mean how regular in shape a 
district is and how close a district’s boundaries are to its 
geographic center.
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Define: Gerrymandering
• The manipulation of 
district lines to  protect 
or change political 
power.
• Maps drawn in a way 
that disadvantages racial 
or ethnic minorities
• One political party using 
unilateral ability to pass a 
map to lock in a 
disproportionate share of 
seats
Define: Cracking
• “Cracking" -Diluting the voting power of a group across many districts
• Historically this technique was used to spread members of minority communities across districts and prevent election of candidates of color
• Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowed for creation of majority minority districts to remedy this practice 
Source: Azavea
Define: Packing
• “Packing“- Concentrating the members of a group in  one district, which reduces their voting power in other districts
• Fine line between concentrated districts (majority minority) to ensure minority representation and super concentrated or packed districts that dilute the minority community’s voting power in surrounding districts
Source: Azavea
Define: Communities of Interest
These are groups of individuals who are likely to have 
similar legislative concerns, and who might therefore 
benefit from cohesive representation in the legislature.
• 24 states consider various communities in defining 
district boundaries, criteria include
• Racial, ethnic, social, cultural, Indian 
reservations, historic interests
• Geographical, regional, county, municipal or 
voting precinct boundaries
• Partisan, voting trends, incumbency
Define: Contiguity
Single, unbroken shape. Like compactness, 
contiguity is considered one of the "traditional" 
redistricting principles.
Non 
contiguous 
shape
Non 
contiguous 
shape
Overview: The Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 
• Outlawed the discriminatory voting practices adopted in many southern states after the Civil War, including literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting
• The Voting Rights Act is broad, which has allowed states to interpret differently and affect competitiveness in legislative districts
12/11/2018
3
Overview: Preclearance 
• Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
• Prior to 2013, Virginia redistricting plans were subject to 
review by the Department of Justice
• The Supreme Court Case Shelby County v. Holder, 570 
U.S. 2 (2013), invalidated the preclearance requirement 
until after a redistricting bill becomes a law
• Litigation  is currently the only way to challenge 
proposed redistricting bills
Overview: Voter Suppression
• In the absence of strong enforcement of the Voting 
Rights Act, multipronged strategies aimed at voter 
suppression have been attempted, most centering on 
voter identification and voter registration
• Examples
• Senate Bill 523- Photo ID in poll books
• House Bill 1598- Require Proof of Citizenship
• House Bill 1428- Require Photo ID for 
phone/email/mail Absentee Voting
Overview: Gerrymandering
• Bethune-Hill v. VA State Board of Elections (2018) 
found that 11 of 100 House districts created in 2011 
were illegally gerrymandered based on race
Overview: Virginia Current State 
• Current Virginia map shows a state that favors one 
party over the other
• Appears to pack minority voters into certain districts 
(Appeals court in Bethune-Hill case determined this 
was ILLEGAL)
Overview: Virginia Current State 
• Virginia has 11 congressional districts. Seven are 
Republican-held, with Democratic incumbents in the 
remaining four. Three Republican-held seats are highly 
competitive; one of those, the 10th district, actually 
leans toward the Democratic nominee.
Overview: Senate Bill 106 (SB 106)
• Proposed by Senator Suetterlein during the 2018 General Assembly Session
• Focused on setting forth new criteria for congressional and legislative districts
• Ensuring redrawing did not dilute communities of interest
• Virginia has historically used redistricting to dilute minority voting power through cracking and packing
• Vetoed by Governor 5/18/18
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Understanding the Players
• Supporters- One Step toward Improvement
• Interest Groups
• Virginia Municipal League, League of Women Voters, OneVirginia2021, NAACP
• Republicans in Virginia State Senate and Republicans and Democrats in Virginia State House of Delegates
• Opponents- Lack of Focus on Communities of Interest
• Democrats in Virginia State Senate & National Democratic Party
Racial Disparity: Minority 
Participation and Representation
• Virginia’s electorate is about 50% female, 60% 
Caucasian with a median age of 45 and nearly 
40% are college graduates
• State legislators skew male (>70%), older (55yo), 
and are predominantly Caucasian (80%+) college 
graduates (>80%)
Racial Disparity: Minority 
Participation and Representation
• Electorate is changing
• By 2040, 50% VA population will be black, non Hispanic Asian or Hispanic
• By 2030, 1 in 5 Virginians will be over 65
• Legislature is changing
• 2017 election, competitive, sent more women, Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans to the Virginia state legislature than in years past
• Opportunity for interracial, political coalition building and shift away from majority minority districts
• 1960s-1980s, districts needed to be 50% or more African American for the favored candidate to win
• In 2016, 50 of the 96 minority members elected to the U.S. House came from districts with no racial majority or a white majority
Trends We’ve Noticed
• Minority voter participation is down
• Independent Redistricting Commissions have been 
known to create more competitive districts
• Engagement with Communities of Interest, 
especially minority groups involves them in 
redistricting process and has better outcomes for 
more competitive districts and less minority packing 
and cracking 
States with Current Independent 
Redistricting Commissions
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Independent Redistricting 
Commissions 
• 5 states use independent commissions as advisory to the state legislature
• 13 states use independent commissions solely for legislative & congressional boundaries
• SJ 25- possible independent commission (7 member)
• Introduced during 2018 session in Virginia
• Will be reintroduced in 2019
• Survey results indicate voters prefer non-partisan efforts for redistricting
• Ensure balanced representation of political affiliation
Polling Shows Public Support of 
IRC
Racial Impact Analysis 
•Determine whether having an Independent 
Redistricting Commission increases 
•Minority voter participation
•Community engagement with minorities
•Competitiveness 
•States used for analysis:
•Arizona-Republican Leaning
•California-Democratic Leaning
•Both have a high population of minorities and 
Independent redistricting commissions 
State Analysis: Arizona
• Independent Redistricting Commission  established in 2001• 5 seats (2 Republican, 2 Democrat, 1 Independent Chair)
• Legislature has term limits
• Despite this, has less minority representatives  in office
• 30 Senate seats, 60 House seats
• Low Minority voter participation
• Commission held 21 public meetings before maps were drawn
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in Arizona 2014
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in Arizona 2016
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State Analysis: California
• Independent Redistricting Commission (2008)
• 14 seats almost even amongst Democrats, 
Republicans & Independents
• Legislature not allowed to appoint representatives
• Term Limits
• More minority representation overtime since IRC was 
enacted
• 40 Senate seats, 80 House seats
• Disparity in minority voter participation despite being 
majority minority state
• Commission held 30 public meetings before maps were 
drawn and 30 meetings after maps were drawn
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in California 2014
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in California 2016
State Analysis: Virginia
• Redistricting conducted by Virginia General Assembly
• No term limits (Senate & House)
• 40 Senate Seats, 100 House of Delegates Seats 
• Minority voter participation consistent with AZ & CA
• VA projected to be majority minority by 2040
• House Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections held 
six meetings before maps were drawn
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in Virginia 2015
Margin of Victory: A Measure of 
Competitiveness in Virginia 2017
12/11/2018
7
Concluding Thoughts
• All three states have a low minority voter participation despite 
greater engagement in redistricting process such as California
• California and Arizona’s legislative elections appear to be more 
competitive than Virginia
• Community engagement is better in California than Arizona and 
Virginia
Recommendation #1: Optimize Community 
Voice through Community Engagement
• Minority voter participation is down
• Current redistricting process only includes 6 public 
hearings before maps are drawn, no public hearings held 
after maps are drawn
• To increase voter participation, must have greater 
community outreach with minority groups
• This creates opportunities for minorities to develop their 
own maps, self-define their communities and incorporate 
their voice into the process
Recommendation #2: Independent 
Redistricting Commission
• Virginia’s current redistricting process and no term 
limits creates less competitive districts
• Arizona and California show more competitive districts 
• In California, there has been an increase in minorities 
and women representatives
• The General Assembly should create an independent 
redistricting commission to increase competitiveness in 
races and produce better outcomes for minorities
• Public support is high for an IRC
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Recommendation #3: Unpack 
Majority Minority Districts
• Studies show majority minority districts are in effect 
keeping more minority representatives from being 
elected to office
• In other states, we’re finding that minority representatives 
can be elected without a majority minority district
• Unpacking majority minority districts increases competition, 
voter turnout and may potentially increase number of minority 
representatives in General Assembly
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Conclusion
• Independent Redistricting Commission approach 
enhances competition and greater representation by 
minorities as evidenced in California
• Unpacking majority-minority districts provides greater 
opportunity for minorities to work together in coalitions 
with like-minded white voters to elect a candidate of their 
choice
• Open, transparent process with community meetings 
targeting young people, immigrants, people of color and 
other traditionally marginalized groups will optimize 
minority participation in redistricting process
QUESTIONS?
